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bringing early challenges to specious patents: Blonder, in permitting
summary judgment of an infringement suit instituted subsequent to
a third party adjudication of invalidity, would permit competitors of
the licensee to engage in open violation of a weak patent with little
economic risk, thereby compelling the licensee to challenge the patent
as early as possible, regardless of whether or not recoupment would ac-
company a successful challenge. It is submitted that further develop-
ment of a point made in the opinion would add support to the court's
conclusion: that recoupment might erode the very foundations of the
federal patent system by compelling inventors to forego patents and
seek instead the protection of the trade secret agreement, thereby
upsetting the present delicate balance between patent and trade secret
law. Finally, principles of state contract law and antitrust law provide
additional grounds, though not utilized by the Sixth Circuit, for re-
fusing recoupment. Specifically, Troxel should be barred from seeking
restitution of royalty payments under state contract law because he
had received considerable benefit from use of the patent; and if re-
coupment were made available as the district court proposed, licensing
agreements could be deemed to incorporate the remedy by implication
and accordingly would be characterized as unreasonable restraints of
trade.
HOWARD B. BARNABY, JR.
Securities Regulation--Investment Company Act of 1940—Control
Transfer Profits—Fiduciary Duty of Mutual Fund Advisers—Kuk-
man v. Baum'—Securities Supervisors, Inc. (Supervisors) served as
the investment adviser and principal underwriter 2 for three open-end
investment companies2—Selected American Shares, Inc. (Selected
American), Selected Special Shares, Inc. (Selected Special), and
Selected Opportunity Fund, Inc. (Selected Opportunity)—pursuant to
management agreements between each of the funds and Supervisors.'
1 346 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
2 As investment adviser, Supervisors provided, in addition to other incidental services,
supervision of investment and analysis of companies, securities, and economic conditions,
and also furnished statistical, administrative and bookkeeping services, as well as office
space and personnel. Id. at 56 n.1.
"As principal underwriter, Supervisors acts as agent of the funds in selling their
shares, at a discount from the public offering price, to dealers who in turn sell the shares
to the public at the applicable public offering price.". Id. at 56.
a The funds are investment companies registered pursuant to the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the
Actl. Section 80a-5(a) (1) defines an open-end company as "a management company
which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the
issuer." For a collection of authorities discussing the history of the Act see Comment,
Protecting the Interests of Mutual-Fund Investors in Sales of Management-Corporation
Control (or, Policing the Traffic in Other People's Money), 68 Yale L.J. 113 n.4 (1958).
4 Section 15(a) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to serve or act as
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In 1969, defendant majority shareholders of Supervisors conducted
negotiations for the sale of approximately eighty percent of Super-
visors' stock to defendant International Industries, Inc. (Interna-
tional) . Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, such a sale
would be characterized as an assignment" and accordingly would ter-
minate the management and underwriting agreements between Super-
visors and the funds and necessitate the fund shareholders' approval of
new management and underwriting agreements between Supervisors and
each of the funds./ Hence completion of the transaction was conditioned
upon approval of the new contracts by the shareholders of each of the
funds.'
The directors of each of the funds approved the proposed agree-
ments and adopted resolutions recommending to the funds' shareholders
the continuation of Supervisors as investment adviser and principal
underwriter under the new management and underwriting agreements.'
Then, in August 1969, the funds' shareholders approved the new
agreements. The sale of eighty percent of the stock of Supervisors to
International was completed shortly thereafter.'
investment adviser of a registered investment company, except pursuant to a written
contract, which contract , . has been approved by the vote of a majority of the out-
standing voting securities of such registered company . . . ." 15 U.S.C. { 80a-15(a)
(1970).
6 Slightly less than 80% of the stock of Supervisors was owned by a group of four
men who composed the senior management team of Supervisors. The remaining 20%
stock interest was retained by eight younger executives. 346 F. Supp. at 57.
0 Assignment is defined as "any direct or indirect transfer or hypothecation of a con-
tract . . . or of a controlling block of the assignor's outstanding voting securities by a
security holder of the assignor ...." 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(4) (1970).
7 15 U.S.C. ¢§ 80a-15(a) (4), (b)(2) (1970).
8 346 F. Supp. at 58.
9 Section 15(c) of the Act provides that:
Lilt shall be unlawful for any registered investment company having a board of
directors to enter into, renew, or perform any contract or agreement, written or
oral, whereby a person undertakes regularly to serve or act as investment ad-
visor of or principal underwriter for such, company, unless the terms of such
contract . . . have been approved by the vote of a majority of directors, who
are not parties to such contract or agreement or interested persons of any such
party, cast in person at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on such ap=
prove!, It shall be the duty of the directors of a registered investment company
to request and evaluate, and the duty of an investment advisor to such com-
pany to furnish such information as may reasonably be necessary to evaluate the
terms of any contract whereby a person undertakes regularly to serve or act as
investment adviser of such company.
15 U.S.C. 80a-15(c) (1970).
Section 10(a) provides that "No registered investment company shall have a board
of directors more than 60 per centum of the members of which are persons who are inter-
ested persons of such registered company." In 1969, the board of directors of Selected
American and Selected Special were identical and consisted of seven directors, only one
of whom was "interested" in Supervisors. 346 F. Supp. at 58. For the duties of inde-
pendent directors see Comment, Duties of the Independent Director in Open End Mutual
Funds, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 696, 724-27 (1972); Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent
Directors, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev, 179, 202-05, 242-46 (1971).
10 At special meetings held on August 20, 1969, the shareholders of Selected Americari
527
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
In late 1970, International experienced a liquidity problem and,
sought to sell its shares in Supervisors." Lincoln National Corpora-
tion (Lincoln) proposed to buy all of the outstanding stock of Super-
visors.12
 As in the first sale, the transaction was conditioned upon ap-
proval of new management agreements by the funds' shareholders.'
The directors of the three funds approved the continuation of Super-
visors" as adviser and underwriter under the new agreements, and those
agreements were approved by shareholders of the three funds at share-
holders' meetings in May, 1971. Thereafter the sale to Lincoln of all
the stock of Supervisors was completed.
Plaintiff, a shareholder of one of the funds, sued both the original
majority shareholders of Supervisors who had sold to International,
and International, asserting that the former had received an excess of
approximately ten million dollars over the net asset value of Super-
visors stock, and that the latter, in the subsequent sale to Lincoln, had
received an excess over net asset value of approximately $5,787,000.
Plaintiff contended that the two sales constituted assignments at a
profit of a fiduciary office—that of investment adviser to and under-
writer for the funds—in violation of common law fiduciary principles.
Plaintiff further asserted that all such profit belonged to the fUnds as
a matter of law." On cross motions for summary judgment, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois HELD: An
investment advisory company's shareholders who sell their controlling
interest in the advisory company may retain the profits without breach-
ing their fiduciary duty under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
since the Act does not impliedly incorporate common law fiduciary
principles.
In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the Kukman
court tacitly followed the result of the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. In-
surance Securities, Inc., 16
 which held that an investment company's
controlling shareholders who sold their interest in the advisory com-
pany may retain their profits without violating the Investment Com-
pany Act. Kukman, however, explicitly held what Insurance Secu-
rities had only suggested: that common law fiduciary principles" were
and Selected Special approved the new agreements, and on September 10 the sale of
80% of the stock of Supervisors to International was closed. 346 F. Supp. at 58. Stock-
holder approval by Selected Opportunity was not necessary because its stock was not
offered to the public until August, 1970. Id. at 58 n.7.
11 Id. at 59.
12 Id. at 59. As part of the purchase, Lincoln) planned to buy the remaining 20%
which was held by a group of younger executives of Supervisors. Id.
15 Id. at 59.
14 The investment adviser was to retain the name "Supervisors."
13 346 F. Supp. at 60.
10 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
17 The common law fiduciary principles involved are as follows: A fiduciary may not
sell his influence with respect to his fiduciary obligee. West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507, 520
(1890) ; Kratzer v. Day, 12 F.2d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Reed v. Catlett, 288 Mo. App.
109, 68 S.W.2d 734 (1934). A fiduciary may not take advantage of opportunities which
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not impliedly incorporated into the Investment Company Act. The
rulings in Kukman and Insurance Securities are in direct contrast to
the Second Circuit's controversial holding in Rosenfeld v. Black" that
the Investment Company Act impliedly incorporates the common law
prohibition against the sale of a fiduciary office for a profit and thereby
forbids personal gain by a mutual fund investment adviser on the
transfer of its advisory contract.
Several factors, which will be referred to below in some detail,
render the Kukman court's interpretation of the Investment Company
Act significant: the conflicting views of the courts as manifested in
Kukman, Insurance Securities, and Rosenfeld, and the uncertainty
such differing interpretations must occasion within the large mutual
funds industry; the number of pending suits brought on the basis of
Rosenfeld; and the proposed federal legislation concerning control
transfer profits.
This note will examine Kukman in light of prior case law and
the legislative history of the 1970 amendments to the Investment
Company Act. It will be submitted that, although the Kukman court
correctly rejected both the result and the rationale of Rosenfeld, it did
not go as far as it might have in providing a justification for its hold-
ing. Finally, the note will examine briefly current proposed federal
legislation intended to resolve the problems involved in control transfer
situations.
The first case decided under the Investment Company Act which
confronted the question of whether the controlling shareholders of
an investment adviser could retain the profits from the sale of their
interest therein was SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 10 a case de-
cided prior to the passage of the 1970 amendments. On facts similar to
those from which the Kukman litigation arose, the SEC brought an
action for injunctive relief and for an accounting, claiming that the
actions of the defendant directors of an investment adviser, who had
sold a controlling interest therein to a group of purchasers at a price
greatly in excess of the net asset value of the stock, constituted "gross
abuse of trust" and "gross misconduct" which were expressly pro-
he may pursue only on behalf of his fiduciary obligee. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S.
204, 212-13 (1945); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Clarke v. Greenberg,
296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947). The dominant shareholders of a corporation may
not sell a controlling interest in the corporation to outsiders, where the result would be to
deprive the corporation of opportunities for gain from controlling distribution to such
outsiders. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). A personal trustee, corporate
officer or director may not sell or transfer such office for personal gain. Gaskell v.
Chambers, 26 Beay. 360, 53 Eng. Rep. 937 (1858); McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55
N.E. 388 (1899); Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914). Directors of a solvent
corporation may not take over for their own profit an opportunity available to the
corporation. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934). The assets of a
corporation may not be wasted or looted by corporate officers acting in a fiduciary
capacity. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.B. 163 (1901).
18 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), settled, 336 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
10 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
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hibited by section 36 of the Act." The specific misconduct alleged was
the sale of control in excess of net asset value: the complaint alleged
that the receipts from the sale represented payment for succession to
the adviser's fiduciary office in violation of common law fiduciary
principles. The SEC also argued that the value attached to the advisory
contracts was an asset of the fund which, under common law fiduciary
principles, could not be appropriated by the investment adviser." For
these reasons, the SEC contended that the sale of a controlling inter-
est in an adviser at a price in excess of net asset value was contrary to
general equitable principles. These principles, the SEC urged, were in-
corporated into section 36."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the complaint, reasoning that the fi-
duciary principles referred to in the complaint were not applicable to
control transfer cases. The court concluded that the Act provided for
specific shareholder remedies aimed at prevention of transfers of con-
trol contrary to the interests of the fund and that these remedies were
intended to be exclusive." The appellate court in Insurance Securities
began its analysis of the Act by examining the policy position con-
tained in the preamble and the remedies provided for in the other sec-
tions of the Act. Section 1(b) (6) declares that a transfer of control
without investor consent is contrary to public policy." The court ruled
that Congress provided a remedy for that evil in section 15(a) (4) of
the Act, which provides for automatic termination of the advisory
contract in the event of an assignment." The Insurance Securities
court, in reading the two sections together, concluded:
[T]he sanction runs against any assignment, whatever the
price paid and received therefor. An assignment at net asset
value is just as fruitless under the section as one for a sub-
stantial price in excess of such value. In either case, the con-
. tract is automatically terminated. In no respect is the amount
20 Section 36 as then written provided:
The Commissioner is authorized to bring an action . . . alleging that a
person serving . . . in one or more of the following capacities has been guilty
. . . of gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust in respect of any registered
investment company for which such person so serves or acts: (I) as officer
• . . of an investment advisor, . . . or (2) is principal underwriter . . . .
Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, I 36, 54 Stat. 841 (1940).
21 254 F.2d at 647-48.
22 Id. at 648.
23 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
24 Section 1(b) provides that ". . . it is declared that the national public Interest
and the interest of investors are adversely affected . . . (6) when investment companies
are reorganized . . . or when the control or management thereof is transfered without
the consent of their security holders." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (1970).
25 Section 15(a) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to serve or act as
investment advisor . . . except pursuant to a written contract . . . ." Section 15(a) pro-
vides in substance for its automatic termination in the event of its assignment. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-15(a) (1970).
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paid or received for stock control made a factor to be con-
sidered."
The court then dealt with the two fiduciary principles set forth in
the SEC's complaint. First, it found that a fiduciary relationship had
existed between the principal shareholders of the investment adviser
and the fund by virtue of the service contracts. However, it held that
there was no sale of a fiduciary office, since the shift in control auto-
matically terminated the service contracts and ended the fiduciary
relationship. The price received for the sale of the stock, then, could
not be said to represent compensation for the sale of a fiduciary office.
The court then addressed itself to the SEC's position that there
was a violation of the equitable principle that a person occupying a
fiduciary relationship will not be permitted to exploit such a relation-
ship for his personal gain in a manner which deprives the beneficiary
of assets to which he is entitled.27 The SEC argued that the value at-
tached to the service contract was an asset of the fund. The court found
this principle of equity inapplicable, reasoning that the value of the
contract did not represent an asset to which the fund was entitled:
"The value which the contract has for Trust Fund lies in the fact that
Trust Fund receives investment, administrative, and sales services
thereunder. That is all that it paid for, and appellant does not contend
that Trust Fund received less.""
In examining the remedy provided by section 15(a) (4), the court
reasoned that the fund shareholders could deny or approve reinstate-
ment of the advisory contracts. It observed that the automatic termina-
tion provision and the ability of the fund shareholders to approve or
disapprove the new advisory contract was the specific remedy under
the Act and provided a sufficient means of furthering the stated public
policy of discouraging transfers of control without investor consent.
Therefore, the section 36 prohibition of "gross abuse of trust" was held
inapplicable to the facts of Insurance Securities.
The Insurance Securities case has been criticized on two grounds.
The first of these criticisms is based on the Insurance Securities court's
interpretation of the policy of the Act. It is argued that in relying solely
on section 1(b) (6) in elucidating the relevant public policy of the Act,
the court improperly ignored section 1 (b) (2), which declares that the
interests of the public and of investors are adversely affected when
investment companies are organized, operated, or managed in the
interest of the investment advisers rather than in the interest of the
investment companies' security holders. The policy expressed in this
provision might be violated if an outgoing investment adviser were
allowed to retain the profits from the sale of its advisory contract.
As Rosenfeld v. .Black was later to note, the prime vice of allowing
26
 254 F.2d at 649.
27 See the summary of common law fidudary principles set out in note 17 supra.
28 254 F.2d at 650.
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the outgoing investment adviser to realize profits in excess of net asset
value is that the outgoing adviser can exert his influence on the fund's
directors to secure fund shareholder approval of the new contracts.
This new contract might not be in the best interests of the mutual fund
and its shareholders." For example, the desire for large profits might
persuade the seller to choose the highest bidder rather than the most
competent adviser." In addition, if the buyer does pay a high or specu-
lative price for the adviser, it might be tempted to adopt management
practices detrimental to the shareholders in order to recoup the high
sales price'
The Insurance Securities court concluded that because an assign-
ment works a termination of the contract and the fund shareholders are
free to reject or approve the new contract, the shareholders are ade-
quately protected by the remedies expressly provided for in the Act.
This conclusion may be criticized on the ground that it overlooks the
relationship between the "interested" directors of the mutual fund and
the outgoing investment adviser." Usually a number of the directors
of the fund are also officers of the investment adviser. Thus, it is
argUed, these directors may face a conflict of interest when presented
with a potential sale of the investment adviser. As officers of the adviser
they will have an interest in maximizing the profit of the potential sale;
as directors of the fund they will have a duty to seek a new adviser
who will serve in the best interests of the fund and its investors."
In 1970, Congress responded to this criticism of Insurance Secu-
rities by amending section 15(c) of the Act to require approval of the
new advisory contract by a majority of the directors of the fund who
are not "interested" persons in the outgoing adviser." This amend-
ment, however, does not diminish the fact that the "uninterested"
directors will still be extremely susceptible to the influence which
"interested" persons may exert upon them. Furthermore, even if the
directors of the fund act solely in the interest of the shareholders, they
may have little choice but to approve the new contract. Failure to ap-
prove might leave the "uninterested" directors in the position of having
to find and bargain with a new adviser or "would have the disasterous
[sic] consequences of leaving the company without management.""
The second criticism which has been leveled at the Insurance Secu-
rities case is directed toward the construction given the Act by the
court that section 15(a) (4) provides an adequate and exclusive remedy
for shareholders, and hence that section 36 does not express an intent
29 445 F.2d at 1346 n.13.
89 Comment, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 153, 159 (1963).
81 Id.
82 See note 9 supra.
88 Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of
1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 266 (1959).
84 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15(c), 15 U.S.C. * 80a-15(c) (1970).
85 House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Investment Company Amend-
ments Act of 1970, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87 (1970).
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to incorporate other remedies for control transfer situations. Replying
to the court's argument that section 15(a) (4) manifests Congress'
intent to provide no remedy against profiteering, one commentator has
noted that:
§15(a) (4) is directed at transfers of control without share-
holder consent, as distinct from profiteering on a transfer of
fiduciary office. Hence, the section on its face hardly compels
the conclusion that it is the exclusive antidote for such con-
duct. The omission of a specific profiteering provision from
the Act probably reflects a Congressional belief that section
15(a) (4) would provide an effective prophylaxis against all
sales of fiduciary positions and, a fortiori against profiteering
from such sales."
In Rosenfeld the Second Circuit agreed with this analysis, reason-
ing that the purpose of section 15 was not to diminish the safeguards
already afforded by equity but to provide the additional protection of
approval of a new adviser by a majority of the fund shareholders."
One authority had argued: "Even a statute as elaborately drawn as
the Investment Company Act could hardly be expected to enumerate
and proscribe all possible types of misconduct, fraud or overreaching
by which a faithless manager might exploit his position.”" These
arguments have some appeal and could have been addressed by the
Kukman court. It will be submitted, however, that although these
criticisms were arguably valid ones prior to the 1970 amendments to
the Act, they are no longer sustainable in light of the amendments and
their legislative history."
Several years after the Insurance Securities case, a minority share-
holder of a mutual fund brought a derivative suit in the state courts of
Delaware seeking restitution of profits realized by the sale of the con-
trolling stock of a management company. In Krieger v. Anderson,"
the plaintiff claimed on behalf of the Texas Fund the difference be-
tween the book value of the shares and the purchase price, but he based
his action on common law equitable principles rather than on the
Investment Company Act. The plaintiff also alleged that this difference
was a premium paid to defendant sellers for their obtaining, through
their domination of the Texas Fund board, shareholder approval and
reinstatement of the advisory contract. The Supreme Court of Dela-
ware held that independent directors who had worked for shareholder
approval of reinstatement of the management contract following a sale
of a controlling interest in the management company had not breached
their fiduciary duties.
80
 Comment, supra note 3, at 131-33.
117 445 F.2d at 1344-45.
88 Greene, supra note 33, at 269-70.
a9 See the discussion of the legislative history of the 1970 amendments in text at
notes 43-49 infra.
40 40 Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (1962).
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The Kukman court approved of the Krieger court's reasoning in
which it partially justified its decision on policy grounds:
[T]he approval of plaintiff's contention would lead to an
anomalous result. Owners of stock of a management company
who have built up the value of their shares through the years
by the exercise of business ability and good judgment are for-
bidden ever to reap the reward of their labor. In other words,
they can never sell the shares for what they are really worth.
This conclusion offends one's sense of fairness. If overriding
considerations of public policy requires [sic] a curb on the
rights of owners of management contracts to realize the full
value of their assets, it is for Congress to sayos .41
It is posited that this policy statement represents the underlying ratio-
nale of the Kukman decision and is illustrative of the prevalent attitude
of the mutual fund industry. 42
In 1967 Congress undertook a revision of the Act. The SEC in its
Mutual Fund Report," issued prior to enactment of the amendments,
seemed to retreat from the position it took in the Insurance Securities
case. The Mutual Fund Report noted inter alia that common law fidu-
ciary principles might be unfair if they denied all compensation to the
management of a fund and recommended that Congress amend the Act
to prohibit sales of a controlling block when it appeared affirmatively
that such sales were likely to impose additional burdens on the mutual
fund or to limit its freedom of future action."
Congress did not accept this recommendation but instead removed
the "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" standard and authorized
the Commission to bring an action under amended section 36(a)
against an investment adviser if he had engaged or was about to engage
"in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involv-
ing personal misconduct . ." 43
It is clear from the legislative history of the amendments that
41 346 F. Supp. at 65, quoting Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. at 367-68, 182 A.2d
at 910.
42 See, e.g., note 64 infra.
48
 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Public Policy Implications of
Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1966)
[hereinafter Mutual Fund Report].
44 The Mutual Fund Report, supra note 43, at 151-52, noted inter alia that:
application of the strict common law principle might well be unfair insofar as it
denies to the retiring management any compensation for the elements of value in
the relationship which they may have built up over the years. The absence of an
opportunity to capitalize to the same reasonable degree on the future earnings
obtainable from this relationship could also be harmful to the fund, since existing
management might be reluctant to surrender that relationship and to provide the
fund with new and possibly more effective management.
The Mutual Fund Report also added that "certain of the protective provisions of the Act
have had the somewhat ironical and presumably unintended effect of diluting the protec-
tions provided by common law principles of fiduciary responsibility." Id.
48 15 U.S.C. § 730a-35(a) (1970).
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section 36(a) is not intended as a ground on which the Commission
may prosecute investment advisers receiving control transfer profits.
The House report stated that section 36(a) "is intended to deal only
with ... violations committed by individuals. It is not intended to pro-
vide a basis for the Commission to undertake a general revision of the
practices or structures of the investment company industry."48 In dis-
cussing section 36, the Senate report stated: "A breach of fiduciary
duty involving personal misconduct in connection with the transfer of
a management organization would be actionable under Section 36 in
the same manner as other violations of the statute. Your committee
sees no need to single out transfer situations for special treatment.”47
Congress also added new section 36(b) which provides:
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser
. . . shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to
the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a
material nature, paid by such registered investment com-
pany .... An action may be brought under this subsection by
the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered
investment company on behalf of such company .. . .48
Section 36(b) provides for express fiduciary duties with respect
to compensation paid to the adviser by the investment company but
makes no reference to control transfer profits. This raises the question:
if general fiduciary duties were already incorporated in the Act, as
Rosenfeld contends, why was it necessary to provide for express fidu-
ciary standards with respect to compensation paid by the investment
company? To impliedly incorporate fiduciary duties into the Act would
render the express fiduciary duties in section 36(b) mere surplusage.
A more probable reading of the Act is that the expressed fiduciary
duties contained in section 36(b), and the language of section 36(a)
which authorizes the Commission to bring an action for breach of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct, are the only fiduciary
duties expressed or implied in the Act.
The Kukman court reviewed this legislative history of the amend-
ment and noted that when Congress amended the Act, it must have
been aware of both the Insurance Securities and Krieger cases, since
they were discussed in the Mutual Fund Report. The amendments did
not alter the results of those cases. Therefore, the court concluded, the
failure of Congress to amend the statute under such circumstances is
persuasive evidence of adoption by Congress of the Insurance Securi-
ties court's construction of section 364 9 It is submitted that the Kuk-
man court's reasoning presents a sound argument based on the amend-
ments' legislative history. Even if it is considered that Insurance
46 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970).
47 S. Rep. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968).
48 15 U.S.C. 80a-35(b) (1970).
49 346 F, Supp. at 64.
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Securities' suggestion that the fiduciary principles are not incorporated
into section 36 of the Act is dictum,' the ultimate result of the case—
that an outgoing adviser could keep all of the profits from the sale—
was squarely presented to Congress by the Mutual Fund Report, as
discussed above. When Congress failed to change the result of the
Insurance Securities case it must be assumed that it approved of that
judicial interpretation of the Investment Company Act.
It is submitted that these statements in the Senate and House
reports, viewed in light of the fact that Congress refused to take any
legislative action changing the Insurance Securities decision, and that
it created express fiduciary duties in the amended statute, adequately
support the conclusion drawn by Kukman that the common law
fiduciary principles are not impliedly incorporated into the Act.
Rosenfeld v. Black" was the first case decided after the 1970
amendments, and it reached a conclusion directly opposite to that of
Insurance Securities. Plaintiffs, shareholders in the Lazard Fund, Inc.,
sought inter alia an accounting of profits realized by Lazard Freres &
Co. (Lazard), an investment banking partnership which had served as
the organizer and investment adviser, when Lazard was replaced by
Moody's Advisors & Distributors, Inc. (Moody's A&D). Moody's
A&D was a wholly owned subsidiary of Moody's Investors Services,
Inc. (Moody's Investors), which in turn was a wholly owned subsidiary
of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (D&B).52
Because of developments in the mutual fund industry," Lazard
had approached D&B and concluded a series of agreements. A new
fund, the Capital Fund, would be organized by Moody's Investors
and the Lazard Fund merged into it. The new Capital Fund, after
merger, would employ Moody's A&D as investment adviser under a
contract similar to the one then in effect between Lazard and the
Lazard Fund. Lazard then entered into another agreement with D&B
so It will be submitted that Insurance Securities held both that sale of an advisory
office at a profit does not violate the relevant fiduciary principles and that common law
fiduciary principles were not impliedly incorporated into section 36. See text following
note 72 infra.
51 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), settled, 336 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). For law
review articles discussing Rosenfeld see, e.g., Butowsky, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct
Revisited—Moses v. Burgin and Rosenfeld v, Black, 17 N.Y.L.F. 735, 752-66 (1971) ; Nutt,
A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 202-05, 242-46
(1971) ; Note, Fiduciary Requirements and the Succession Fee Upon the Change of Mutual
Fund Advisers, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 655 (1972) ; Comment, Mutual Fund Control-Transfer
Profits: Congress, the SEC, and Rosenfeld v. Black, 58 Va. L. Rev. 371 (1972); Comment,
Mutual Fund Advisers, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1429 (1971),
52 445 F.2d at 1338.
53 The Lazard Fund, as originally set up by Lazard, did not engage in a continuous
public offering of its shares. The shrinkage caused by redemptions unaccompanied by sales
was expected to be counteracted by an additional offering. However, because mutual fund
industry developments accelerated shrinkage to the extent that it would not be likely to be
offset by such an offering, Lazard concluded that the Fund would be best served if it were
to engage in a continuous offering. Lazard approached D&B in order to facilitate this plan.
Id. at 1339.
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which provided that D&B, upon consummation of the merger, would
transfer 75,000 shares of its common stock in consideration of certain
covenants made by Lazard." The plaintiff alleged that the real con-
sideration given by Lazard in return for the 75,000 shares was not the
covenants but rather Lazard's assistance in bringing about approval
of the merger by the Fund's directors and the consequent appointment
of Moody's A&D as investment adviser."
The district court granted summary judgment for the defen-
dants." But the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that an investment company adviser is prohibited from profit-
ing on the transfer of its advisory contract since common law fiduciary
principles are impliedly incorporated into the Act.
The Second Circuit began its analysis of Rosenfeld, not with an
examination of the specific provisions of the Investment Company
Act, but with the conclusion that Lazard, in its position as investment
adviser, was a fiduciary of the fund and therefore according to estab-
lished principles of equity was obliged to forgo personal gain from
the change of office.
The court rejected the argument that the automatic termination
required by section 15(a) (4) ended the fiduciary relationship and that
therefore there was no advisory office that Lazard could sell or transfer.
The court noted that "the role of Lazard, an organizer of the Fund
and its practical control of the proxy machinery used to recommend
the approval of Moody's A&D as new adviser, made it quite as active
and influential as a corporate president who recommends a successor
to his board of directors . . . .""
Rosenfeld, citing a law review article" as authority, also rejected
the Insurance Securities rationale that sections 15(a), (c), and (d)
were exclusive remedies and displaced the common law. Noting the
policy contained in section 1(b) of the Act, the court stated that "the
purpose of § 15 was to furnish the added protection of approval of a
new adviser by a majority of the stockholders, not to withdraw safe-
guards already afforded by equity.""
The Rosenfeld court's treatment of the legislative history of the
1970 amendments appears less than satisfactory. The court was, not
able to point to anything in the legislative history to support its posi-
tion that the common law was incorporated into the Act. Nor did the
84
 The covenants by Lazard promised inter alia that for a period of five years Lazard
would not (a) become associated with another investment company; (b) permit use of the
name "Lazard" by such investment company; and (c) act as principal distributor for any
open end investment company. Id. at 1339-40.
88 Id. at 1341-42.
58 Rosenfeld v. Black, 319 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
57 445 F.2d at 1344.
58 Comment, Protecting the Interests of Mutual-Fund Investori in Sales of Manage-
ment-Corporation Control (or, Policing the Traffic in Other People's Money), 68 Yale L.].
113, 121-28 (1958).
69 445 F.2d at 1344-45.
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court adequately address itself to the fact that new express fiduciary
duties were contained in amended sections 36(a) and 36(b). Rosenfeld
stated that "Congress could well have thought it had handled the prob-
lem created by Insurance Securities by expanding the SEC's power
under § 36.'30
It has been submitted above that amended section 36(a) was not
intended to apply to control transfer profits. Section 36(b) explicitly
establishes fiduciary duties with respect to compensation paid by the
investment company. The Rosenfeld court stated that "the content
makes plain that Congress did not mean this to be the only fiduciary
duty of investment advisers." 61 As has been submitted, to incorporate
fiduciary duties into the Act by implication would render the carefully
drafted express fiduciary duties in section 36(b) mere surplusage."
The Rosenfeld decision brought a quick negative reaction from
the Chairman of the SEC" and the mutual fund industry," and dire
predictions concerning the potential liability of outgoing investment
advisers. 05 In addition, a number of lawsuits. were instituted predicated
on the Rosenfeld theory."
60 Id. at 1348.
01 Id.
62 See text following note 48 supra.
08 SEC Chairman Casey stated: "If [Rosenfeld] stands so that anybody starting a
new mutual fund or management company will have no prospect of building up any equity,
I think it would certainly effectively stop most people from starting new companies
As long as we believe that the investment company is performing a useful function .. .
then there should be a set of rules which gives the people who perform that economic
function the same kind of opportunity of profits and capital that you get in other businesses
.... I think this may take legislation if Judge Friendly's decision is the final law." Casey
on the Issues, Institutional Investor 30 (Oct. 1971).
64 Charles R. Eaton jr., president of Eaton & Howard Funds, said, "I personally
believe that if you create value, the value is a salable asset. As a matter of principle you
ought to have the right to sell what you create." Newsweek, Aug. 2, 1971, at 67-69; see
also Heinemann, Mutual Funds Face Crisis, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1971, * 3, at 1, col. 1.
85
 One commentator estimated the potential liability of selling managers at 5750
million. Newsweek, Aug. 2, 1971, at 67-69. The General Counsel of the Investment Com-
pany Institute estimated potential liability involved in litigation at $600 million. BNA Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. No. 121, at A-3 (Oct. 6, 1971).
86 At least sixteen lawsuits have been brought since Rosenfeld. Butowsky, Fiduciary
Standards of Conduct Revisited—Moses v. Burgin and Rosenfeld v. Black, 17 N.Y.L.F.
735,753 n. 68 (1971).
However, it is difficult to determine how long the Rosenfeld opinion will stand as law.
In Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972), Chief Judge Friendly noted the threat
of judicial and legislative overruling when faced with an appeal from a settlement in the
lower court concerning profits realized by a sale of advisory stock to the public. Plaintiffs
sought on behalf of the fund an accounting of profits received by sellers in a public offering
of a controlling block of shares in the fund's adviser and principal underwriter. The court
noted without expressing approval or disapproval that the defendants had shown a distinc-
tion between Rosenfeld and Newman. The defendants in Newman argued that in offering
the adviser's stock to the public there was no termination of the adviser but a continuation
of a successful one under a new management contract.
The court made a point not argued by appellees or considered in the Kukman case.
It reasoned that Rosenfeld dealt with a company that only acted as the fund's adviser,
whereas in Newman, the company acted as adviser and principal underwriter. According
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Kukman v. Baum, after reviewing the prior case law and the
legislative history of the Act, agreed with Rosenfeld on the narrow
issue that an investment adviser is a fiduciary with respect to the
mutual fund which it advises, and that under common law principles
the beneficiary of this relationship is entitled to recover profits on the
fiduciary's sale of office.° 7 However, Kukman refused to hold that
these common law principles are "impliedly incorporated" into the
Act and joined the Insurance Securities case in ruling that no part of
the profits are recoverable by the fund.
The defendants in Kukman urged the court not to follow the
Rosenfeld case because it was factually distinguishable and erroneously
decided." They attempted to distinguish their case from Rosenfeld on
the ground that Rosenfeld had involved a sale of the adviser itself
(a partnership), while Kukman involved only the sale of controlling
stock in the adviser. They argued that since Supervisors never ceased
to exist as an entity, the advisory relationship never terminated. The
defendants further argued that since there was no change in Super-
visers' managing personnel or in the management policies followed by
Supervisors, there was no termination of the advisory relationship.
The Kukman court rejected these arguments and ruled that there was
no sound way to distinguish the facts from Rosenfeld. The court
stated:
[P]ersonnel will eventually be retired or terminated and re-
placed by those persons in control of the investment manage-
ment corporation. Further, the promises not to change
management policies . . . may well conflict with and be
subordinated to the fiduciary's responsibility to alter man-
agement policies in light of changing business or economic
conditions."
Although the Rosenfeld court had explicitly noted that it did not
find it necessary to consider whether a sale of a controlling block in
a corporate adviser was sufficiently different to warrant a different
result," it is submitted that the Kukman court rightly refused to
to the court, the holding of a fiduciary relationship between a fund and its adviser might
not necessarily require a similar holding as to an underwriter, and it is arguable that a
deduction from the profits should be made to reflect the adviser's distribution activities.
Id. at 697. A settlement of $5 million was therefore held reasonable.
67 346 F. Supp. at 61.
68 Id.
DD Id.
76 The court noted:
While we do not find it necessary at this time to determine whether the difference
between a transaction such as that here before us and the sale of a controlling
block in a corporate adviser at a price reflecting the expectation of profits under a
renewed contract with the corporation which the sellers were to aid in procuring,
is sufficiently substantial to warrant a different result in this latter case, we should
not wish to be understood as accepting these views.
445 F.2d at 1346.
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distinguish the situation before it from that in Rosenfeld. First, the
defendants' argument that the advisory relationship between Super-
visors and the funds was never terminated is untenable since sections
2(a) (4) and 15 clearly require that a sale of a controlling block of
stock in an investment adviser be treated as an assignment resulting
in termination of the advisory contract. Furthermore, most advisers
are already incorporated. If a prohibition on transfer profits were
limited so as not to apply to a sale of a controlling block of stock,
those advisers not presently incorporated would simply incorporate
when they wish to transfer control. "It would be anomalous, then, if
fiduciary standards `impliedly incorporated' by the Act distinguished
between the two cases.'" 1
The Kukman court chose, therefore, to hold Rosenfeld indistin-
guishable on its facts from the case before it and to attack its holding,
calling its treatment of the legislative history both superficial and
highly subjective." As was submitted above, Kukman was correct in
its statutory interpretation and its examination of legislative history.
There is no authority for the Rosenfeld court's conclusion that the
((established prophylactic rule" has been impliedly incorporated into
the Act.
It was the position of the Kukman court that the common law
was not impliedly incorporated into the Act. Yet the Kukman court
focused primarily on the language in Insurance Securities which dealt
with the absence of a relationship between the congressional purpose,
as set out in the preamble to the Act, and the price paid for shares
of an investment adviser. Kukman failed to discuss that portion of
the Insurance Securities opinion dealing with the relation of common
law principles to section 36 of the Act. It is submitted that the Kuk-
man court could have used this opportunity to clarify the Insurance
Securities position and thus could have strengthened its own position
that the common law is not impliedly incorporated into the Act.
After the Insurance Securities court had held that there were no
breaches of any fiduciary duties, and that section 36 was inapplicable,
it went on to discuss the remedy provided by Congress in section
15(a) (4). The court concluded that section 15(a) (4) was a specific
remedy and the only remedy which was necessary to protect fund
shareholders after an assignment of the contract. It could be argued
that since the court already had stated its ruling that section 36 was
inapplicable, any discussion of the common law principles was mere
dictum. It is submitted, however, that because the Insurance Securities
court took' the view that section 15(a) (4) was the only remedy for
the specific evil before it, and because the court failed to connect the
common law fiduciary equitable principles to section 36, the case could
be read as also holding that the common law is not incorporated into
71 Comment, Mutual Fund Control-Transfer Profits: Congress, the SEC and Rosen-
feld v. Black, 58 U. Va. L. Rev. 371, 407 (1972).
72 346 F. Supp. at 65.
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section 36." This suggested reading of the case could have provided
precedential support for the Kukman court. Indeed, the Rosenfeld
court had earlier read this portion of the Insurance Securities case as
"suggesting that in the court's view none of the excess of the price
received by the controlling stockholders over the book value of their
stock would be recoverable under any circumstances by stockholders
of the investment company." 74 Finally, it should be noted that Kukman
also failed to examine critically the provision of amended section 36
imposing an express fiduciary duty with respect to compensation paid
by an investment company. It is submitted that an analysis of this
provision similar to the one outlined above" would also have been
helpful to the court's statutory construction.
Although Kukman represents the proper interpretation of the
amended Act, it is submitted that legislation should be introduced to
clarify the issue and to balance properly the interests of fund investors
and advisers. Such legislation should protect the fund investors as
well as provide compensation for the outgoing advisers. Rosenfeld and
Kukman have raised policy questions that must be answered by
Congress.
Shortly before the Kukman case was reported, amendments to
the Act which would allow sellers to retain profits were proposed by
the SEC." Under these amendments, the outgoing investment adviser
would be permitted to receive benefits in connection with the assign-
ment only if no affiliated" person of the advised company was an
interested" person in either the outgoing or incoming adviser for five
years after the assignment. In addition, the assignment must not
impose an unfair burden on the investment company. The receipt
by the outgoing adviser, during a two year period after the assignment,
of any compensation in connection with certain transactions of the
investment company or for services other than bona fide advisory or
administrative services would be deemed to impose an unfair burden
on the investment company. Also, directors evaluating the terms of an
advisory contract would be prohibited from taking into account any
consideration which the adviser may have paid in connection with an
assignment of the contract.
Representatives of the mutual fund industry argued that the five-
year restriction was too harsh and could result in additional costs to
the funds because of the need to hire new people not connected with
either management company. 7° Consequently, the original bill was
73 Compare Comment, supra note 58, at 120 n.27 (1958) ; The Mutual Fund
Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer 732, 961 (1969) ; Comment, supra note
71, at 380.
74 445 F.2d at 1346.
76 See text following note 48 supra.
76 See [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 428, June 16, 1972, at 12.
77 For a definition of "affiliated person" see 15 U.S.C. g 80a-2(a) (3) (1970).
78 For a definition of "interested person" see 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a) (19) (1970).
70 Address by Senator Williams, before the Securities Industries Assn Management
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modified to require that for three years after the sale of a manage-
ment company, at least seventy-five percent of the directors would
have to consist of persons having no interest in the management
company."
It is difficult to predict at this time precisely what legislation will
be passed by Congress. It is suggested, however, that any amendment
that is adopted should empower a reviewing court to determine the
overall fairness of the transaction when the assignment price is in
excess of net asset value. This standard would be in addition to the
proposed requirement that at least seventy-five percent of the board
of directors would have to consist of persons having no interest in the
management company. Any test of fairness should also include a deter-
mination of the extent to which the sale price was a premium for the
use of influence and of the extent to which the price was based on the
expectation that the efficiency and reputation of the purchased organi-
zation would lead to reinstatement. A court reviewing the sale price
could consider such variables as the expertise of the management
personnel, the value of any successful investment formula, and
whether the management of the fund in question is the only business
of the outgoing adviser.
Of course, such a fairness formula may be difficult for a court to
develop, requiring painstaking application of business expertise; the
difficulty, however, should not discourage a court from examining an
overall transaction. Courts have drawn on the talents of experts in
balancing competing interests in many other areas of the law. It is
submitted that a more equitable result for both investors and advisers
would be worth the extra time and effort which this proposal would
entail.
In conclusion, the decision in Kukman reaffirms the holding in
Insurance Securities that a mutual fund cannot recover any profit from
the sale of a controlling interest in its adviser. Kukman also rejects
Rosenfeld and explicitly holds what Insurance Securities suggested:
that common law fiduciary principles are not impliedly incorporated
into the Act. It is submitted that Kukman is correct in its interpreta-
tion of the Act. However, congressional action is needed to resolve
the judicial conflict. Congress must properly balance the interests of
fund investors and advisers and empower the courts to consider the
overall fairness of the transaction.
RICHARD M. CARLYN
Conf., Sept. 7, 1972, reprinted in [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,979, at 82,108-09
(1972).
80 Id. at 82,109.
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